I. INTRODUCTION
On September 2, 2009, the Department of Justice announced the largest health care fraud settlement in United States history. Pfizer, one of the world's largest pharmaceutical companies, along with its subsidiary, Pharmacia & Upjohn Company, Inc., ("Pfizer") agreed to pay the federal government $2.3 billion in civil and criminal fines to resolve liability involving the illegal promotion of its pharmaceutical products.
2 Although Pfizer's liability stemmed from its promotion of four different pharmaceuticals, the company's most egregious offense was the promotion of its antiinflammatory drug, Bextra. 3 When Pfizer sought approval of Bextra in 2001, the FDA was only willing to approve the drug for a few specific uses. 4 Most notably, the FDA declined to approve Bextra for the treatment of acute pain due to safety concerns following a study of patients who were given Bextra after they underwent coronary artery bypass surgery. 5 The results of the study indicated that there were an "excess of serious cardiovascular thromboembolic events," or blood clots, after Bextra was administered to the patients. 6 However, despite the FDA's specific disapproval, Pfizer engaged in an elaborate marketing scheme to sell Bextra for its unapproved uses, particularly its use for acute pain, from 2002 through 2005.
7 Some of the marketing techniques that Pfizer used to promote Bextra included the following: unsolicited medical information was sent to physicians about unapproved uses, samples of the drug were sent to surgeons who had no FDA-approved use for the drug, Pfizer sponsored "independent" medical education programs about unapproved uses, and Pfizer distributed to its sales force explicit instructions on how to promote the drug during sales calls to physicians. 8 Pfizer continued to promote Bextra for unapproved uses until it voluntarily pulled the drug from the market in 2005, at the FDA's request. 9 Pfizer's behavior with regard to its promotion of Bextra is known as "off-label" promotion, which occurs when a pharmaceutical company promotes its products for uses not approved by the FDA. 10 Pharmaceutical manufacturers are generally prohibited from promoting their pharmaceutical products for off-label uses.
11 However, because physicians are permitted to prescribe drugs for on-label and off-label uses, pharmaceutical manufacturers have an incentive to inform physicians about all of the possible uses of their products in order to increase sales. 12 Therefore, when Pfizer promoted Bextra for off-label use, it risked legal culpability in order to reap the benefits of increased sales of the drug. In the end, Pfizer paid a monumental price for its decision to engage in off-label promotion.
preemption of the pain of surgery, and opioid sparing.").
5. Id. 6. Id. 7. Id. at 8. 8. Id. 9. Id. 10. Pfizer Press Release, supra note 2. 11. The FDA has established guidance documents that pharmaceutical manufacturers should follow when disseminating information about off-label uses of their pharmaceuticals. Although the general rule is that no pharmaceutical manufacturer can promote off-label uses, the guidance documents provide a few exceptions to this general prohibition. This issue will be discussed more extensively in Section II of this note. 
A. The Issue
Pfizer does not stand alone within the pharmaceutical industry in its decision to engage in off-label promotion. In fact, the practice seems to be commonplace. 13 Although many other pharmaceutical manufacturers have settled claims involving off-label drug promotion recently, the magnitude of the Pfizer settlement demonstrates the seriousness of the federal government's enforcement efforts and its commitment to change this widespread behavior. 14 The sources of federal law that served as the basis for Pfizer's offlabel marketing liability were the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") and the False Claims Act ("FCA"). 15 While the FDCA has traditionally been used to regulate illegal off-label marketing behavior, the use of the FCA as an additional legal tool to police the same behavior has only recently emerged. 16 Attaching FCA liability to off-label marketing has not only made it possible for the Department of Justice ("DOJ") to pursue the pharmaceutical industry for putting the public's health at risk, but it has now permitted the DOJ to pursue the pharmaceutical industry with a justification that it is protecting the American taxpayers from health care fraud. 17 The DOJ is no exception in its recent enforcement efforts under the FCA; in fact, all three branches of federal government have embraced this new theory of off-label promotion liability and have played some role in expanding the scope of the FCA.
The federal government has recently shifted from the traditional regulatory approach, with regard to off-label promotion by the pharmaceutical industry, to an enforcement and punishment approach. Currently, the government's focus seems to be more on punishing fraud than on balancing the risks and benefits of pharmaceuticals on the public health. 18 No one can deny the federal government's strong interest in preventing a company's bottom line, as in the case of Pfizer, from taking priority over the public's health and safety. However, it is also necessary to hold the government accountable for overreaching their policing abilities. Recently, in the name of fraud, the federal government has rigorously pursued the pharmaceutical industry by attaching FCA liability to off-label promotion, despite the existence of the regulatory framework already in place to prevent this behavior.
B. Roadmap
This Note examines the recent enforcement efforts surrounding offlabel promotion in the pharmaceutical industry. Section II of this Note explores the regulatory and enforcement background in the off-label context, and begins by taking a look at the federal law that serves as the basis for off-label marketing liability, specifically, the FDCA. Additionally, Section II explores the past enforcement efforts by the federal agency charged with regulating off-label promotion under the FDCA, the FDA. Section II also introduces the basic elements of the FCA and shows how this federal antifraud statute has been used to impose liability on the pharmaceutical industry for off-label promotion. Section III of this Note demonstrates the FCA's recent expansion as applied to off-label promotion, and also shows how each branch of our federal government has contributed to the FCA's expansion in the off-label context. Additionally, Section III examines how the expansion of the FCA will likely affect the pharmaceutical industry and demonstrates that the FCA is not the most appropriate tool at the federal government's disposal when it comes to policing off-label promotion. Finally, Section III proposes that the federal government should leave offlabel regulation to the agency that is best equipped to balance the public's health and safety interests, the FDA. A brief conclusion is presented in Section IV. 
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The FDCA's purpose is to protect the health of the public by preventing adulterated or misbranded drugs from entering into interstate commerce.
20
In 1938, Congress put the FDA in charge of a mandatory pre-market approval process for all new pharmaceutical products pursuant to the FDCA.
21
The FDA remains responsible for conducting the pre-market approval process for prescription pharmaceutical products and is also responsible for 19. 21 U.S.C. § § 301-399. The Act's passage was a response to public concern over a health crisis that occurred in 1937, when a Tennessee company marketed an untested "wonder drug" that resulted in over 100 deaths, many of them children. The FDCA provides that "no person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed . . . is effective with respect to such drug."
23 Therefore, before a drug may be sold or marketed in the United States, the FDA must approve that drug's New Drug Application ("NDA"). 24 But even before a drug manufacturer submits the NDA, the new drug must be approved for clinical trials. 25 In other words, the drug manufacturer must prove that its drug is safe for human testing by obtaining pre-approval of its drug as an Investigational New Drug ("IND"). 26 After IND approval and the subsequent clinical trials take place, the manufacturer is required to submit, through the drug's NDA, various information about the new drug such as: reports of investigations that show whether the drug is safe and effective for use, components of the drug, a statement about the composition of the drug, a description of the manufacturing, processing, and packaging methods, samples of the drug, and proposals for the labeling of the drug.
27
As part of the NDA evaluation process, FDA officials determine whether the potential benefits of the new drug will justify the possible safety risks of the drug. 28 In essence, the FDA engages in a cost/benefit analysis when deciding whether to approve a drug for entry into the market. If the benefits to the public health outweigh the risks, then the drug will be approved for the market, and the FDA will also get a say in what specific warnings or dosages go on the new drug's label. 29 Once the FDA approves the new drug for introduction into interstate commerce, additional uses for the drug may not be added to that drug's label without submitting another NDA, a supplemental application for that 22 drug. 30 Therefore, a drug manufacturer must go through much of the drug approval process again in order to get approved for a new use of the drug. Because the new drug approval process is lengthy-estimates show that the average "time from the start of clinical testing to marketing approval [is] . . . 90.3 months"-many pharmaceutical manufacturers have figured out ways to circumvent the process. 31 Also, if the drug is already on the market and being prescribed by physicians, and the only purpose of submitting a supplemental new drug application is for the ability to market the existing drug for a new use, a pharmaceutical company is unlikely to spend the money and time on the application. 32 In other words, "[i]f an off-label use is already well known among physicians, adding it to the label would likely have little effect on sales." 
What is an Off-Label Use?
Although there is no explicit statutory definition of an off-label use, the term "off-label" takes root in the FDCA. 34 Because the FDCA mandates FDA approval of a drug's specific use and additionally requires that such use be accurately reflected on the drug's label, a drug is used off-label when that use has not been approved by the FDA. 35 However, the FDCA specifically exempts physicians from the labeling and prescription requirements that apply to drug manufacturers. 36 Therefore, physicians are permitted to write prescriptions to patients for off-label use of a drug, without penalty under the FDCA. 37 In fact, physicians take advantage of the exception, as it is estimated that between twenty-five to sixty percent of all prescriptions are written for off-label uses. 38 An example of an off-label use would be if a physician treated a patient for acute pain with Pfizer's drug, Bextra. The FDA never specifically approved Bextra for the treatment of acute pain; therefore, the use of Bextra to treat acute pain would be considered an off-label use. 
Violating the FDCA Through Off-Label Promotion
There are several different types of promotional activities employed by the pharmaceutical industry to boost a drug's sales, including: professional journal advertisements, magazine and newspaper advertisements, brochures, product giveaways, presentations at conferences, continuing medical education seminars, or company-sponsored events, oral statements by sales representatives during hospital visits, and many more. 39 If a pharmaceutical manufacturer is promoting its products for FDA-approved uses, then these promotional activities are perfectly legitimate. However, as soon as the manufacturer promotes products for an off-label use, the marketing practices become illegitimate. 40 To clarify, there are two main ways that a drug manufacturer may violate the FDCA through its off-label promotion of a pharmaceutical product. The first type of violation occurs when a drug that was previously approved for certain uses, is promoted for other non-FDA approved uses, as the drug is effectively an unapproved "new drug" under the FDCA. 41 The "FDA sees off-label promotion as the equivalent of introducing an unapproved new drug into interstate commerce in violation of the FDCA." 42 In essence, the FDA regards the off-label promotion of non-approved drug uses as if the pharmaceutical manufacturer skipped the NDA process altogether. Second, the FDA may hold a drug manufacturer liable for off-label promotion of a drug as a misbranding violation under the FDCA. 43 Because the FDA approves each drug's particular label for certain uses and dosages during the NDA process, when a drug is promoted for a use other than the use on the label, the drug is considered misbranded. 44 Pharmaceutical companies that introduce unapproved new drugs or misbranded drugs into interstate commerce can face civil and criminal penalties under the FDCA. 45 Pfizer, for example, was held liable for misbranding the drug Bextra, 46 and consequently, had to pay a fine of $1.195 billion, the largest criminal fine ever imposed in our nation's history. 
Is Off-Label Marketing Problematic?
There are benefits and risks associated with both off-label use and offlabel marketing. With respect to off-label use, experts in the legal and medical communities are divided on whether the practice should be more or less regulated. 48 Concerning marketing, there are critics that contend the FDA should loosen regulation. 49 Being that there are strong public policy arguments on both sides of these issues, the FDA is put in a difficult position. It is the FDA's responsibility to look out for the public's health while balancing the benefits of off-label use. Therefore, the FDA must walk a fine line when making decisions associated with off-label use and marketing. The agency must encourage the innovation needed to cure diseases and save lives, while also minimizing the risks associated with drugs that have not been rigorously tested for safety and effectiveness.
a. Benefits of off-label use and marketing
Many feel that off-label drug use is essential to providing patients with optimal medical care. 50 Also, "because the pace of medical discovery runs ahead of the FDA's regulatory machinery, the off-label use of some drugs is frequently considered to be "state-of-the-art" treatment."
51 Thus, many feel that it is extremely beneficial to employ off-label uses of pharmaceuticals. Patients with terminal illnesses often depend on the innovative use of pharmaceuticals already on the market, especially when other drugs have failed to provide a cure during the course of their treatment. 52 It is only logical that, for example, in the field of oncology, if one drug proves to be effective for a certain type of cancer, the drug may prove to be effective for another type. 53 Even if the drug is not approved for the latter type of cancer, the patient would likely prefer to use that drug off-label rather than wait for the manufacturer to submit an NDA, because, after all, that patient will likely not have time to wait. Also, doctors tend to off-label prescribe for "socalled orphan populations and orphan diseases-populations too small and diseases too rare to justify the expense of petitioning the FDA for new la- beling." 54 Besides oncology, patient care in the medical fields of pediatrics, psychiatry, geriatrics, obstetrics, and many others, "could not proceed if offlabel prescribing did not occur."
55 Furthermore, the FDCA explicitly authorizes physicians to prescribe drugs for off-label uses. 56 This explicit authorization is direct evidence that our legislature views off-label use as appropriate and necessary in many contexts.
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Promotion of off-label uses is also recognized as being very important for the pharmaceutical industry. The main benefit associated with the practice of off-label promotion "is to inform the health care community about scientific advances that will benefit patients, thus improving the quality of health care without waiting for the lengthy FDA approval process."
58 Ensuring that the medical community has up-to-date information about existing drugs that may be beneficial in the treatment of known ailments is a compelling reason to allow pharmaceutical companies to promote their unapproved products. Also, because the medical professional is the ultimate decision-maker when it comes to prescribing a drug for an off-label use, it seems harmless to inform them about potential off-label uses.
59
The research and development that pharmaceutical companies perform is crucial to the progress of health and medical science. There is an undeniable benefit of disseminating information about possible curative drugs to physicians as well as the public. However, while society may try to give pharmaceutical companies the benefit of the doubt when it comes to producing safe and effective drugs as well as providing truthful information about those drugs, it cannot ignore the fact that pharmaceutical companies are also accountable to their shareholders for earning a profit. 60 54. Tabarrok, supra note 49, at 28. 55. Dresser & Frader, supra note 28, at 476. Many drugs are not tested on certain groups of individuals (for example, children and pregnant women) and as a result, are not approved for safe use on these populations. As a consequence, children, pregnant women, or older individuals must use the drug off-label in order to benefit from several types of drugs. This does not necessarily mean that the drug is unsafe for use on these populations, but that the use is not approved by the FDA. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Drugs, Uses of Drugs Not Described in the Package Insert (Off-Label Uses), 110 PEDIATRICS 181 (2002). See also, Ausness, supra note 24, at 1254-55. However, also note that "the FDA have claimed to be speeding up and simplifying the supplemental approval process, especially with regard to the most significant "orphan" population, children. Tabar 
b. Risks associated with off-label use and marketing
It is a risky practice to distribute pharmaceuticals to the public without ensuring that the products are safe and effective for the condition they will be used to treat. As mentioned earlier, the FDA engages in a cost/benefit analysis when it approves drugs for particular uses. However, the problem with off-label use is that the drug did not have an opportunity to go through the FDA's formal analysis to determine safety and efficacy for a particular condition. The approval safeguards associated with drugs that have undergone the NDA process are not present when a physician prescribes a drug for an off-label use. While the FDA assumes physicians will ensure that an off-label use is generally accepted within the medical community before writing a prescription, "appropriate off-label prescribing can be challenging for physicians today, because of time pressures, information overload, and the involvement of industry in research and development about off-label uses." 61 A 2009 study on U.S. physician knowledge of FDA-approved indications discovered that "many U.S. physicians may lack adequate knowledge of the FDA-approved indications of drugs they prescribe" and "a significant minority [of U.S. physicians] also prescribes some drugs for off-label indications, in the belief that they are approved for such uses, despite uncertain or no supporting evidence." 62 Another study of off-label use by private practice physicians reported that only twenty-seven percent of off-label uses were supported by strong scientific evidence of clinical efficacy. 63 Compared to off-label use, the risks associated with off-label promotion by pharmaceutical companies are more obvious, given the companies' interest in selling their products. The FDCA was originally enacted to protect the public from purchasing unsafe products and to keep businesses from marketing dangerous, untested drugs. 64 In the past, pharmaceutical companies have been caught engaging in unethical and illegal off-label marketing practices. 65 These companies tend to take advantage of the fact that physicians are busy people that may not have the time to seek out credible resources regarding off-label uses. One can guess that pharmaceutical companies hope that physicians will simply rely on the pharmaceutical sales representatives' assertions, or assume that the off-label research presented to them is unbiased and credible. 66 Before 1997, all off-label marketing attempts by the pharmaceutical industry were prohibited.
68 Any attempts by a pharmaceutical manufacturer to discuss off-label uses with medical professionals, or to distribute written promotional materials to the medical community, were prohibited. 69 Only when a physician solicited off-label use information did the FDA allow a manufacturer to disseminate that information. 70 However, the Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997 ("FDAMA") changed the FDA's prior position of prohibiting pharmaceutical manufacturers from off-label marketing. 71 The FDAMA amended the FDCA to allow "drug . . . manufacturers to disseminate certain written information on a use of a product that is not described in the product's approved labeling to health care practitioners . . ." 72 The FDAMA provided that, in order to distribute off-label information, a pharmaceutical company must file with the FDA "[a] supplemental application based on appropriate research to establish the safety and effectiveness of the unapproved use." 73 Under the FDAMA, pharmaceutical manufacturers could send certain journal article reprints to physicians and discuss unapproved uses of drugs during continuing medical education seminars as long as the seminars were independent and not controlled or sponsored by the pharmaceutical company. 74 Through the FDAMA, the FDA seemed to reach a balance between allowing for the dissemination of beneficial educational information on offlabel uses to the medical community, while ensuring that off-label promotional activities were still regulated. However, this balance expired on September 30, 2006, due to the FDAMA's sunset provision. 75 Upon expiration of the FDAMA, the FDA subsequently issued "Good Reprint Practices," a set of guidance documents on dissemination of off-label educational materials, in order to fill the regulatory gap that the FDAMA left behind. 76 Because the FDA recognizes "the public health value to healthcare professionals of receiving truthful and non-misleading scientific and medical information . . ." the agency thought it was important to continue to allow guided dissemination of off-label information.
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Under the current Good Reprint Practices guidelines, issued on January 13, 2009, the FDA relaxes off-label restrictions even further than Congress did under the FDAMA. 78 First, the guidelines are just thatguidelines. Although issued by an administrative agency, they are nonbinding and are emphasized as such in the language of the guidelines. 79 Next, submission of a supplemental new drug application is no longer required if a company decides to promote an off-label use. 80 Finally, the FDA does not require the pharmaceutical manufacturer to submit its promotional materials prior to their distribution to the medical community.
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Although the FDA's current approach to off-label regulation is more relaxed than in the past, the current guidelines still only permit dissemination of journal articles and scientific reference publications that adhere to the FDA's specifications. 82 Although off-label promotion is allowed in certain contexts, it is still prohibited in many other contexts. Therefore, sending out promotional samples at dosages not approved by the FDA would still be considered off-label promotion.
The FDA has met much criticism regarding its new guidelines, as some critics argue that the guidelines "could possibly harm public health by allowing manufacturers a back door for putting products into the health care setting for unapproved uses without having to . . . gain FDA approval." 83 Furthermore, many believe that the FDA is ineffective in its regulation of off-label promotion in general. 84 Because the FDA's off-label guidelines only address written promotional materials, other promotional practices go undetected, for example, when pharmaceutical sales representatives inap- propriately discuss off-label uses with physicians. 85 Whether the FDA has made a conscious decision not to pursue certain types of off-label promotional activity or is unable to detect the majority of off-label promotional activities due to limited resources, there are distinct regulatory gaps when it comes to the FDA's detection of off-label promotion.
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B. Regulating Fraud and Off-Label Promotion Through the False Claims Act
Also known as the "Lincoln Law," Congress passed the FCA in 1863 after pressure from President Abraham Lincoln "to combat profiteering by Union Army suppliers during the Civil War." 87 The FCA has since become the federal government's primary tool for combating fraud.
88 Generally speaking, the FCA prohibits false or fraudulent claims from being submitted to the government in order to procure government payment.
89 Additionally, the FCA "provides an alternative strategy" to the FDCA to combat off-label promotion. 90 Many view the FCA as "the single most important tool U.S. taxpayers have to recover the billions of dollars stolen through fraud by U.S. government contractors every year." 
a. Qui tam provision
The FCA has a "qui tam" provision, also commonly referred to as a "whistleblower" provision. 92 This qui tam provision enables private citizens to bring claims on behalf of the federal government. 93 This qui tam provision is enormously effective at exposing fraudulent activity that may be too discrete for the federal government to notice. For example, the Pfizer settlement was ignited when several qui tam relators came forward to report the fraudulent activity that was a part of the company culture at Pfizer. 97 Because Pfizer decided to settle with the federal government, the qui tam relators that were involved in the suit recovered over $102 million dollars.
98 John Kopchinski, a former Pfizer sales representative, was the highest paid relator in the settlement with a share of $51.5 million. 99 This payment was, in effect, compensation to Mr. Kopchinski for putting his career on the line in order to report his ex-employer's actions of defrauding the government through off-label marketing practices. 
b. Possibility of government intervention
After a qui tam relator brings a suit on behalf of the government, the government has an opportunity to intervene in the litigation.
101 By intervening in the suit, the government will resume responsibility for the litigation. 102 The qui tam relator is permitted to remain a party to the suit; however, the government is not bound by any act of the qui tam relator after intervention occurs. 103 This qui tam provision benefits relators because he or she will still have the opportunity to recover a percentage of any amount retrieved by the government in the litigation, but will not incur the litigation costs that he or she otherwise would have incurred absent the government's intervention. 104 Furthermore, government intervention usually leads to settlement in the off- label context because of the government's ability to threaten a manufacturer with exclusion from government reimbursement programs. 105 A drawback to this provision, however, is that the government is required to investigate all qui tam actions brought by relators. 106 The government thus has discretion to dismiss the qui tam relator's action after their investigation.
107 By involving the government, a qui tam relator can either greatly benefit from the government's intervention or risk losing the suit entirely.
c. Threat of treble damages.
Another noteworthy provision of the FCA is the treble damages provision. 108 If a person or an entity violates the FCA, they are "liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus three times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person."
109 Further, the fines are assessed for each individual fraudulent claim. 110 The threat of treble damages is one likely reason that many FCA cases are settled out of court.
Applying the FCA to Off-Label Promotion
The FCA has undergone several amendments since its inception in the nineteenth century. While past amendments have limited the scope of the FCA, amendments in the past three decades have broadened its scope. In 1986, Congress amended the FCA with the aim of "retooling [the Act] as an instrument capable of rooting out government fraud, particularly in defense as well as healthcare spending." 111 The 1986 amendments to the FCA increased the qui tam relator's potential share of the recovery, increased the penalties per FCA violation, and added the treble damages provision.
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Since 1986, false claims suits against the health care industry have risen drastically.
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As stated earlier in this Note, the FCA has become an additional enforcement tool used by the federal government to pursue off-label promotion violations. However, it is important to address the reasoning behind why off-label promotion creates FCA liability, especially considering that 105. The threat of exclusion will be discussed further in Section III of this Note. 106. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a). 107. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(a). 108. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006 the term "off-label" takes root in the FDCA, and the consequences for promoting pharmaceutical products for off-label uses are provided for under the FDCA. 114 So, how do prosecutors tie the practice of off-label promotion to liability under this federal fraud statute?
Pharmaceutical manufacturers depend a great deal on government reimbursement programs like Medicare and Medicaid to pay for sales of their prescription drugs. 115 Under the FCA, if a pharmaceutical manufacturer causes the federal government to pay a false claim under Medicare, for example, as a result of their off-label marketing practices, the FCA may be used as a tool to recover the money that the government paid out to the manufacturer. 116 In the history of regulating off-label promotion through the FCA, two legal arguments are usually made in order to attach liability to pharmaceutical manufacturers.
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One theory of liability under the FCA is to hold pharmaceutical companies "liable for making false claims about [their] drug."
118 Certain offlabel uses are prohibited from reimbursement under federally funded government health care programs. 119 Therefore, under this first theory, if a pharmaceutical sales representative make an untrue claim regarding the safety and effectiveness of their product to a physician, which in turn leads that physician to bill a federally-funded government health care program, such as Medicare, for reimbursement of that off-label use for their patient, then this action has the effect of causing a false claim to be made to the federal government.
A Therefore, liability under the FCA can arise when pharmaceutical manufacturers promote off-label uses of their products, even when the statements are credible, knowing that the federal government will reimburse the physician who prescribed its products.
Using the FCA as a tool to regulate behavior in the pharmaceutical industry has become much more common in the last decade.
123 Federal prosecutors are thus pursuing pharmaceutical manufacturers under the FCA after the manufacturer violates the FDCA. As mentioned earlier, the FDA seems to lack the ability to police certain "off the record" instances of offlabel promotion. The qui tam provision gives insiders in the pharmaceutical industry the ability to police the off-label practices that the FDA cannot detect. However, critics wonder whether it is reasonable to attach FCA liability upon the pharmaceutical industry when the off-label marketing behavior is so loosely connected to the language of the statute and also, when off-label marketing is already specifically regulated by the FDCA.
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Whether one agrees or disagrees with the FCA's use in the off-label context, the reality is that the three branches of our federal government have all contributed to the gradual increase of the pharmaceutical industry's liability under the FCA.
III. ANALYSIS: TAKING A LOOK AT THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY'S LIABILITY FOR OFF-LABEL MARKETING AS THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT CONTINUES TO EXPAND THROUGH THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
A. The Expansion of the False Claims Act
As stated previously, the FCA has recently been used as an enforcement tool to police the practice of off-label marketing by the pharmaceutical industry. While the health care industry has been subject to FCA liability in the past, theories of potential liability related to off-label promotion by pharmaceutical manufacturers have only developed within the twenty-first century. 125 has not only developed quickly, but has flourished 126 and the expansion of the FCA is now apparent in all three branches of our federal government. While not all expansion efforts are directly related to policing off-label promotion, the widening scope of the FCA will surely affect the pharmaceutical industry. And this expansion of FCA application continues to occur without thorough judicial consideration of whether its use is really proper in the off-label context.
Executive Expansion of the FCA
More than any other branch of government, the executive branch has extended the FCA's reach to off-label promotion practices the furthest. The executive department that has primarily contributed to this expansion is the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), the federal department responsible for enforcing federal laws. Although other federal agencies contribute to the investigative and enforcement efforts related to off-label promotional activities, the DOJ is the primary enforcement agency for violations of the FCA as well as the FDCA. 127 This was not always the case, however, as in the past the FDA exclusively oversaw off-label marketing practices, primarily through a regulatory approach to enforcement. 129 If the FDA decides that its regulatory efforts are not correcting improper off-label promotional behavior by a pharmaceutical company, the FDA can refer the violations to the DOJ for civil or criminal enforcement action. 130 As an alternative to adhering to the traditional FDA-initiated enforcement method, the DOJ can also initiate investigations and prosecutions of off-label marketing violations on its own. 131 It is through this latter method of enforce- When a pharmaceutical manufacturer decides to market a drug for an off-label use, the FDA regulates that manufacturer's behavior solely through the FDCA. 132 However, because the DOJ enforces federal law, the DOJ can prosecute that same illegal off-label marketing behavior under the both the FDCA and the FCA. 133 Therefore, a pharmaceutical manufacturer that is pursued by the DOJ can be liable for both FDCA and FCA violations. 134 It is disconcerting that the DOJ's prosecutorial investigations of pharmaceutical companies for off-label marketing are triggered by violations of the FDCA and not the FCA. Although it is appropriate for the DOJ to pursue FDCA violations, the agency that controls and ensures compliance with the FDCA, the FDA, is usually not initially involved in the prosecutions. 135 Basically, the FCA claim would not exist if not for a violation of the FDCA.
Although, as discussed earlier, the DOJ can initiate off-label prosecutions without direction from the FDA, it is qui tam relators that usually make the DOJ aware of a pharmaceutical manufacturer's off-label marketing practices. Because qui tam relators have great monetary incentives for reporting their company's off-label marketing schemes, off-label suits brought by qui tam relators are extensive.
136 After a qui tam relator files suit, the DOJ will investigate the relator's allegations and decide whether to intervene in the litigation. 137 Once the DOJ decides to investigate a pharmaceutical manufacturer for off-label marketing, the department will usually contact the FDA to assist in the investigation and resolution of the suit.
138
If the DOJ does decide to intervene in the qui tam suit, a settlement agreement between the DOJ, FDA, and the accused manufacturer usually follows.
Therefore, FCA suits initiated by qui tam relators are a significant initiator of the DOJ's off-label enforcement agenda. 139 The use of the FCA in the off-label arena has enabled qui tam relators and the DOJ to take the place of the FDA when it comes to regulating and enforcing the pharmaceutical industry's off-label promotion practices.
b. Steady increase in amount and magnitude of settlements
Throughout the past decade there has been a steady increase in the magnitude of damages collected through off-label settlements as well as the amount of cases settled for off-label violations. 140 The threat of treble damages, mentioned in Section II, is one apparent reason why pharmaceutical manufacturers are unwilling to take a gamble at trial for violating the FCA.
141 But even beyond this strong deterrent, the DOJ has another tool at its disposal to encourage settlement of FCA claims. This powerful settlement-inducement tool is known as "debarment," which is the exclusion of a pharmaceutical company or its products from federal government health care reimbursement programs, like Medicare and Medicaid.
142 Critics characterize the threat of exclusion, or debarment, from federal reimbursement programs as a "nuclear threat" or a "corporate death sentence" due to the fact that "exclusion can completely choke off a company's revenue stream by eliminating access to the patients who buy the drugs." 143 As a result, pharmaceutical manufacturers likely see it as imperative to cooperate with federal prosecutors in the DOJ when this threat is on the table.
Between 2003 and 2007, the DOJ has settled at least eleven cases involving off-label marketing allegations against various pharmaceutical companies.
144 Of these settlements, at least nine involved the imposition of civil monetary fines through the FCA. 145 For the fiscal year 2009, the DOJ reported FCA recoveries totaling over $2.4 billion. 146 This FCA recovery amount was the second largest since the expansive 1986 amendments to the FCA. 147 This increase of the number and magnitude of settlements involving pharmaceutical manufacturers for off-label promotional behavior continues to rise. 148 The DOJ only demonstrates an intention to continue this The company's intention was to mislead and coerce physicians into prescribing Bextra for off-label uses. 160 As a result, Pfizer was punished for this behavior under the FDCA. The $1.195 billion dollar penalty was the largest criminal penalty ever imposed in the United States. 161 However, Pfizer's punishment for its off-label marketing behavior went even further.
Pfizer also settled FCA liability with regard to Bextra. 162 However, beyond the FCA's qui tam feature that enabled Pfizer employees to bring Pfizer's off-label marketing behavior to the federal government's attention, Pfizer's specific violation of the FCA is still unclear. And because Pfizer did not make an admission during the settlement with regard to any FCA liability for the promotion of Bextra or the other three pharmaceutical products that it was charged with violating under the FCA, there is not much detail with regard to Pfizer's specific improper actions. 163 However, we do know that Pfizer caused claims to be submitted to federal reimbursement programs through physicians for off-label uses of its drugs. 164 And despite a lack of knowledge with regard to the specifics of the DOJ's FCA allegations against Pfizer, it is evident that the threat of exclusion from government-backed health care programs was a factor in Pfizer's willingness to pay such a high settlement amount related to FCA liability.
The Pfizer settlement also implies that a pharmaceutical company will likely pay out millions, if not billions of dollars, if an off-label marketing scheme can be proven or even alleged by the federal government. It seems that if the government can target off-label marketing by a pharmaceutical manufacturer, then FCA liability will follow. In essence, the FCA provides a way for federal prosecutors to 1) discover off-label marketing violations that the FDA otherwise would not have discovered, and 2) increase the penalty for the off-label marketing scheme in order to recover more money for the federal government.
c. DOJ's focus on fraud
The DOJ has continued to exhibit its intention to prosecute fraud whenever possible. When announcing recent off-label promotion settlements, although the importance of safety within the pharmaceutical industry is often mentioned, the announcements focus more on the recovery of taxpayer dollars through the FCA. 165 160. See generally United States' Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 4 (demonstrating overall off-label scheme by Pfizer to sell its drug, Bextra, for FDA-unapproved uses).
161. The total criminal penalty was $ Policing health care fraud and recovering funding for government health care programs are stated priorities of the DOJ: "the DOJ . . . recognizes both the urgency in the need to recover those funds and the need to ensure that such fraud does not reoccur." 166 In May 2009, to demonstrate its focus on fraud and the recovery of funds for the federal government, the DOJ announced the creation of the Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team ("HEAT"). 167 The HEAT task force is comprised of the DOJ, the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), as well as other state and federal law enforcement agencies.
168 HEAT contributed to the 2009 Pfizer settlement. 169 Additionally, much like the assistance given by qui tam relators to detect FCA violations, HEAT is calling upon the general public for assistance in the detection, prevention, and prosecution of fraud.
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In his speech before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Tony West, U.S. Assistant Attorney General, stated, "We have a duty to the taxpayers. . . . While most medical or pharmaceutical providers are doing the right thing, when Medicare or Medicaid fraud occurs, it costs the American taxpayers real dollars. . . . It is those wrongdoers who we must stop."
171 Traditionally, the concern that would arise when a pharmaceutical manufacturer chose to market its drugs for off-label uses was that the public's health and safety was put at risk because the marketed drugs had not been put to appropriate safety and efficacy tests. Currently, when a pharmaceutical manufacturer decides to engage in off-label marketing, the main concern seems to be that the manufacturers are defrauding government programs that are funded by taxpayer dollars. 172 The victims of off-label marketing are no longer users of the pharmaceuticals; rather, the victims are now the American taxpayers. No matter how the DOJ frames the issue, the victims of off-label marketing are admittedly the American public. Nonetheless, because the DOJ is shifting the off-label marketing issue's focus to fraud, the DOJ is using the political climate to push an agenda that expands the scope of the FCA.
Judicial Interpretation of the FCA
The judicial branch of government has contributed the least to the expansion of the FCA. In fact, the Supreme Court of the United States attempted to limit the FCA's application, although this limitation was not 166 within the off-label context. 173 Many FCA qui tam suits related to off-label promotion are dismissed in the early stages of litigation, especially when the federal government does not intervene or join in the suit. 174 For example, many qui tam relators have trouble surviving motions to dismiss because they do not plead their fraud claim with particularity. 175 Furthermore, no reported FCA case related to off-label marketing has ever gone to trial. Therefore, FCA claims related to off-label marketing violations have still not undergone sufficient judicial review. 176 However, despite the procedural difficulties that qui tam relators may face when bringing an FCA claim, the judicial system has nonetheless expanded FCA liability to the pharmaceutical industry for off-label marketing violations. A single judicial opinion effectively opened the floodgates to the pharmaceutical industry's potential liability for off-label marketing under the FCA. 177 Through one denial of a motion to dismiss, the district court judge created significant leverage for the executive branch when negotiating settlements for off-label marketing with the pharmaceutical industry.
a. Franklin v. Parke-Davis
The Parke-Davis case proved to be groundbreaking because it legitimized the use of the FCA to pursue pharmaceutical manufacturers for offlabel marketing. 179 Although Justice Saris' opinion was based on a denial of Parke-Davis' motion to dismiss a qui tam relator's suit, the opinion has nevertheless proved to be enormously influential.
The This unanimous decision by the Supreme Court seemed to suggest the court's desire to limit the scope of the FCA. The Subcontractors in Allison Engine arguably had a much closer link to a government payout than any pharmaceutical manufacturer may have to government reimbursement of an off-label prescription. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court felt that the link was too attenuated and declined to attach FCA liability to the Subcontractors. 203 The Supreme Court reasoned that when a defendant makes a false statement to a private entity for reimbursement without the intention that the government rely on that false statement as a condition of payment, then the "direct link between the false statement and the Government's decision to pay or approve a false claim is too attenuated to establish [FCA] liability."
204 It is quite possible that a pharmaceutical company could apply the Supreme Court's analysis in Allison Engine to defeat FCA claims based on off-label marketing by asserting a "direct link" defense to government payout or claim a lack of intent to influence payment by the federal government.
What is interesting about the Allison Engine decision is that the dispute in question involved a more traditional application of the FCA. As mentioned earlier, the FCA was enacted during the Civil War in order to prevent profiteers from hindering the war effort with "rampant fraud and shoddy supplies." 205 The Allison Engine case involved Navy shipbuilders that claimed reimbursement for work that did not adhere to the Navy's specifications. 206 Therefore, even when applying the language of the FCA to a more traditional fact pattern, the Supreme Court limited liability.
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Because FCA liability tied to off-label marketing schemes is based on less traditional legal arguments than the arguments made in Allison Engine, it is not too far-fetched to predict that our Supreme Court may also limit liability in the off-label context based on the language of the FCA.
After the announcement of the Allison Engine decision, it was not long before many defendants used the case to assert defenses against FCA claims by qui tam relators. 208 Although Allison Engine demonstrates that courts are willing to limit the scope of FCA liability, the Parke-Davis opinion still holds to expand liability for off-label marketing under the FCA. In fact, in a recent case brought by a qui tam relator against a pharmaceutical sought to make available any tool at the federal government's disposal to deter and punish those businesses. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the background of FERA demonstrates this point:
To make sure this kind of collapse cannot happen again, we must invigorate our anti-fraud measures and give law enforcement agencies the tools and resources they need to root out fraud so that it can never again place our financial system at risk. Taxpayers, who bear the burden of this financial downturn, deserve to know that the Government is doing all that it can to hold responsible those who committed fraud in the run-up to this collapse. 227 As a result, the powerful enforcement tool that has been used to reach off-label marketing was strengthened. Therefore, when enacting FERA's amendments to the FCA, Congress did not fail to mention how important the legislation was to fixing our nation's broken economy in the wake of the banking crisis.
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Congress did not hesitate to take advantage of the current political climate when expanding the scope of a major tool that the federal government uses to extract funding from companies that defraud the federal government. Imbedded in FERA, an economic recovery bill, were amendments to a federal law that has the ability to do significant damage to any business that is directly or indirectly paid with government funds. 229 An enforcement tool that is capable of such severe damage seems worthy of more legislative consideration. However, because the FCA is such an effective tool at recovering money for the federal government, Congress did not hesitate to expand its scope.
B. The Effect of Continued FCA Expansion on the Pharmaceutical Industry
The days of commonplace off-label promotion in the culture of the pharmaceutical industry seem to be coming to a close. When taking the actions of all three branches of the federal government as a whole, it is conceivable that pharmaceutical manufacturers' potential liability under the FCA will only continue to increase. Although the above three sections addressed each branch of government's contribution to the expansion of the FCA separately, it is important to take a look at the cumulative effect of the federal government's expansion of the FCA on the pharmaceutical industry.
DOJ possessed and used against pharmaceutical manufacturers in the past for off-label marketing enforcement became even more powerful through FERA. 236 Because the DOJ has demonstrated an increased pursuit of the pharmaceutical industry throughout the past decade, it is unlikely that this trend will stop, especially with additional support from Congress. 237 It is likely not coincidental that the landmark Pfizer settlement occurred only three months after the FERA amendments were passed and the HEAT task force was created. 238 Some critics argue that the massive settlement amounts will not stop the pharmaceutical industry from continuing to promote their pharmaceutical products for off-label uses. 239 Because the pharmaceutical industry is a multi-billion dollar industry, many companies have the ability to include potential settlement amounts into their business plans.
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For example, when Pfizer settled with the DOJ for $2.3 billion, the billion-dollar figure was accounted for in Pfizer's fourth quarter earnings. 241 However, this settlement amount decreased Pfizer's quarterly profit by ninety percent. 242 Furthermore, the settlement amounts have only increased over the years. 243 If settlements continue on the path of costing pharmaceutical companies billions of dollars, off-label promotion may not continue to be commonplace in the industry.
It is clear at this point that liability for off-label marketing under the FCA is not going to disappear any time soon. The goal of recovering taxpayer dollars in the wake of a troubled economy may be noble; however, the federal government's focus on this goal is clouding its judgment when deciding the proper tool to use when regulating off-label marketing.
C. The Federal Government Needs to Refocus Its Off-Label Enforcement Efforts
The federal government needs to reassess its aggressive enforcement of the pharmaceutical industry with regard to off-label marketing under the FCA. FDCA law already provides for actions by pharmaceutical manufacturers to promote their products for off-label uses. When the DOJ pursues a pharmaceutical manufacturer for off-label marketing violations, the bases for those pursuits are the manufacturer's violation of the FDCA. As the cians-in continuing medical education seminars and in hospitals. The FDA can also conduct better oversight of promotional materials that lack strong scientific support. 253 It may even be possible for the FDA to begin a campaign to provide financial incentives to physicians and others who report off-label promotion by pharmaceutical companies. 254 This system could mimic the role of FCA qui tam relators.
One benefit of FCA qui tam litigation, as mentioned previously, is that it has unveiled various off-label marketing techniques employed by pharmaceutical manufacturers. 255 The FDA has previously been unable to detect these types of marketing techniques because they are done behind closed doors. However, now that qui tam litigators have revealed these various techniques, the FDA can devote its resources to detecting these violations.
IV. CONCLUSION
The FCA's main purpose is to prevent fraud perpetrated upon the federal government. Despite the fact that the FCA does not provide any specific penalty for off-label promotion, the federal government has successfully connected the pharmaceutical industry's off-label marketing schemes to a purported intention to defraud the federal government. At first blush, this connection seems to make some sense. After all, the pharmaceutical industry depends upon federal health care reimbursement programs for a large percentage of its profits. Therefore, when a pharmaceutical manufacturer engages in illegal off-label promotion, this promotion will eventually cause a claim to be submitted to a government health care reimbursement program for an off-label use. Thus, when the federal government reimburses the pharmaceutical manufacturer based on an initial illegal action, the manufacturer is effectively defrauding the federal government. The DOJ justifies its rampant pursuit of pharmaceutical manufacturers based on this train of thought. Through this justification, the federal government has effectively recharacterized traditional public policy considerations under the FDCA, while pursuing FCA liability for off-label marketing.
No one can deny the public's interest in punishing pharmaceutical companies for deliberately putting the public's health at risk in order to turn greater profits. However, it is important that the federal government uses the correct enforcement tools to punish off-label marketing behavior. Because FCA liability for off-label marketing always starts with a violation of the FDCA, the FDCA, and not the FCA, is the proper federal law to enforce
